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Fukuyama gets a letter from paranoid Hungary – but why not me?
05 February 2012 12:21 PM | 1 CommentBut like all state bureaucrats, and even like the Communist censors of the past regime, they miss the point of the article, thereby confirming and reinforcing the message. (Maybe it is at this point that Kovacs was trying to demonstrate that institutions DO matter).
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Nabucco’s bubble bursts
19 January 2012 1:51 AM | No CommentsNabucco's bubble grew with the momentum built on the concept of security of supply for Europe. For companies and governments who supported the project, their commitment and involvement meant that the momentum needed to be maintained.
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Why Hungary’s revisionist energy strategy will fail
17 July 2011 4:40 PM | No CommentsFirst, let's have a good laugh. "a competitive state player." While this is an oxymoron, the state can't be a 'competitive' player in a game when it is also the referee.
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After Fukushima: Assessing nuclear power projects in CEE/SEE
19 March 2011 1:44 AM | No CommentsBe Sociable, Share! TweetTweet
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The False Energy Accomplishments of Hungarian EU Presidency
20 January 2011 11:45 AM | No CommentsBe Sociable, Share! TweetTweet
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Hungary to follow Tajik model: Forced donations for Surgut/MOL shares
03 January 2011 9:24 AM | No CommentsBe Sociable, Share! TweetTweet
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Recent Posts
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Short, Short Nabucco Man
21 February 2012 12:48 AM | No CommentsBut a shorter and smaller Nabucco? Is it really the big Nabucco that we know? The pipeline extending from the Caucasus all the way to Austria? Well, no not really. It is another pipeline plan that relies on the Turkish infrastructure (or the jumble of other pipelines that have to be sorted out).
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Shale gas, time for traditional risk assessment, part II
17 February 2012 2:21 AM | No CommentsAs the technology of fracking improves, the industry becomes more knowledge about the local geology and political/public landscape, and as state institutions introduce regulatory safeguards - responding to public concerns, shale technology will become more widely deployed.
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Shale gas, not bound by traditional risk assessments? Part I
14 February 2012 2:07 AM | No CommentsTraditional risk analysis demonstrates shale gas is just like you and me - not a superstar Hollywood actor. The debate around shale gas as a 'game changer' needs to give way - including in the media - to a new level of analysis that sees the industry as bound by traditional political-economic risks.
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Diffusion of Regulatory Governance: the rise of transnational regulatory networks
08 February 2012 6:10 PM | No CommentsBe Sociable, Share! TweetTweet
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Fukuyama gets a letter from paranoid Hungary – but why not me?
05 February 2012 12:21 PM | 1 CommentBut like all state bureaucrats, and even like the Communist censors of the past regime, they miss the point of the article, thereby confirming and reinforcing the message. (Maybe it is at this point that Kovacs was trying to demonstrate that institutions DO matter).
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E.ON gets fed up and disposes of E.ON Bulgaria
In one sense the headline that E.ON chose for its own press release says it all:
E.ON disposes of E.ON Bulgaria
The reason given in the press release is due to the corporate strategy of divesting “15 billion euros in assets by the end of 2013. So far more than 9 billion euros have already been realized.” Couching the disposal of a corporate unit as wrapped up in the shifting corporate strategy is as polite as a corporations gets to admitting that maybe after seven years of this relationship (the seven year itch?) things didn’t work out well. How much things didn’t work out can be seen in the original purchase price and the proposed sale price of the unit to the Czech based Energy Pro. E.ON paid EUR 140 million in 2004 and is now selling it for EUR 133 million!! A EUR 7 million loss after 7 years of continued investment in the company.
View from trash can in Bulgaria
The first notable reason for the difference in buying and selling price can be seen that E.ON overpaid in 2004. During this expansionist period of German, French and Italian utilities there was firm bidding on the different companies throughout the South East of Europe. The expected long-term time horizons, perceived favorable regulatory environments and the economic growth of the countries all led investors to see self sustaining units that could provide profitable revenue streams. However, soon after privatization and the sale of the unit to E.ON by the Bulgarian state, the regulatory and political environment were not as rosy as they first appeared.
My analysis here is based on a 2009 study Vidmantas Jankauskas (former regulatory of Lithuania) and I wrote about in a report funded by USAID and NARUC. This examines the privatization process and the post-privatization issues arising from the sale of the distribution companies in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania. The research is based on a series of interviews, mainly in-person, that we conducted in the summer of 2008 with company representatives, regulators and other professionals connected to the privatization process.
The dedication to the privatization process of the essentially bankrupt country of Bulgaria in the post-communist era can be seen in the significant rate increases. In 2002 rates were increased 20%, then 15% in 2003 and finally 10% in 2004. A regulatory agency was established and the tariff methodology was established so all potential investors could see this before bidding. However, after privatization the sand quickly shifted under E.ON’s feet (and other investors, EVN and CEZ).
At the time of writing the report in 2008, the Bulgarian energy regulator and the privately owned distribution companies, seemed to have enough of each other. Loses were now seen being forced on the companies due to the decision by the regulator not to increase electricity rates.
Applied and Granted OPEX andCAPEXCosts for E.ON Bulgaria
Source: E.ON, “Tariff Decision 2008, 2nd regulatory period.” in, “Power distribution firms to sue utilities regulator over electricity price hikes – Business news.” July 9, 2008.
In the world of boring electric distribution companies, the above case demonstrates the state is ready to force losses, onto the distribution companies, while also cutting the overall service quality that these companies can provide for consumers. This article, describing the terrible service of E.ON Bulgaria and bidding it farewell, may be more representative of the unwillingness of the state owned transmission system operator to invest and the inability of all companies to invest sufficient amounts into the overall Bulgarian electric system. Low prices for consumers may also translate into poor service.
In a telling interview, with a key individual involved in the privatization of the Bulgarian distribution companies, he stated that these fights between the companies and government don’t tell the whole story. Rather the companies were viewed as having made out rather well, and were profitable along with buying the companies at a low value. This perspective has always informed my analysis of the situation in the country. There may be fights, but maybe these investors are better off than they let on. I think the final sale price demonstrates that this is not the case. The actions of the Bulgarian government and even the independent regulator have not served the people of Bulgaria or the investors since privatization. The rate increases before privatization demonstrate the willingness to open up and allow market forces, but the actions of the state since then demonstrate the great distrust of private capital and somehow energy prices should be kept low at all costs – even if this means damaging the service quality, investor expectations and overall economic growth of the country.
The actions in Bulgaria should serve as a warning sign to other investors and governments. It is true that E.ON sold the unit to another private company, thus demonstrating that investors remain interested in the country. However, the long term growth and the operations under such a tight and awkward regulatory environment demonstrates that even after 7 years of investments the value of the company has dropped, service quality has not improved, and South East Europe is no longer the place for large investors. Other countries, like Hungary, Macedonia and even Romania should take note. Investors will not hang on forever to wait for economic and political policies to see profits or at least a stable operating environment to materialize. Private investors seek to modernize the national energy infrastructure, failure here results in wider economic, environmental and societal failures – caused by government actions.
About Michael LaBelle
Michael LaBelle provides a critical but light hearted analysis of the complex field of EU and CEE/SEE energy politics and business. He is based in Budapest, Hungary. He can be reached at michael.labelle(at)energyscee.com