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Fukuyama gets a letter from paranoid Hungary – but why not me?
05 February 2012 12:21 PM | 1 CommentBut like all state bureaucrats, and even like the Communist censors of the past regime, they miss the point of the article, thereby confirming and reinforcing the message. (Maybe it is at this point that Kovacs was trying to demonstrate that institutions DO matter).
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Nabucco’s bubble bursts
19 January 2012 1:51 AM | No CommentsNabucco's bubble grew with the momentum built on the concept of security of supply for Europe. For companies and governments who supported the project, their commitment and involvement meant that the momentum needed to be maintained.
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Why Hungary’s revisionist energy strategy will fail
17 July 2011 4:40 PM | No CommentsFirst, let's have a good laugh. "a competitive state player." While this is an oxymoron, the state can't be a 'competitive' player in a game when it is also the referee.
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After Fukushima: Assessing nuclear power projects in CEE/SEE
19 March 2011 1:44 AM | No CommentsTweet
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The False Energy Accomplishments of Hungarian EU Presidency
20 January 2011 11:45 AM | No CommentsTweet
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Hungary to follow Tajik model: Forced donations for Surgut/MOL shares
03 January 2011 9:24 AM | No CommentsTweet
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Recent Posts
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Hungarian Politics Torpedoes Nabucco Participation
01 May 2012 12:36 PM | No CommentsThere is no point in covering up the power center of the Hungary. It resides in PM Orban. Regardless of the state involvement in the Nabucco project it is a privately supported initiative with politics secondary. This has always been the selling point - even if politics are tightly woven into the plans
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Screw company profits: This is Energy Capitalism
19 April 2012 12:20 AM | No CommentsTweet
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Shale gas arises in France and Bulgaria
10 April 2012 12:55 AM | No CommentsDomestically sourced shale gas, provides two elements for security of supply. It provides another source of gas, which can be used to reduce dependence, and reduce pricing of Russian gas. It also boosts energy security. Therefore, ignoring the role that shale gas plays in a countries energy supply is not in the interests of politicians.
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The Bursting of Energy Bubbles
22 March 2012 11:12 AM | No CommentsThe energy sector is littered with the corpses of energy technologies that were based on rosy projections, technologies that were surpassed by newer technologies unleashed by altered regulatory landscapes.
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Five Reasons why the War of Energy Technology is on
11 March 2012 5:28 AM | No CommentsThe war of energy independence is on! Like all wars there will be losers. And like some wars, we stumbled into this one. Through the narrowing of options, outdated partnerships and the emergence of new options, the global energy landscape is getting on a new footing.
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Would Surgut investment in MOL save CEE oil flow?
The question should be asked whether an emerging decline in oil being shipped to Central Europe could be stopped if Russian investment took place in the region’s refinery sector. And more pointedly, whether Surgutneftegaz’s investment in MOL could save the CEE region from declines in Russian oil shipments. According to this well written analysis from EurActiv.com,
Russia’s growing oil exports to Asia and the Baltic have unsettled European traders and refiners, who fear shortages on the Black Sea and in Central Europe should Russian output stall or decline.
The point that makes this report credible is that the decline is not from a coordinated policy, but one that is emerging gradually over time, due to new supply routes and customer base. While, shifting the supply of Russian energy sources have been threatened in the past, it appears that a coordinated strategy has yet to be implemented. This decline appears to be emerging from the gradual growth, from more localized and less coordinated infrastructure building.
The northern European markets and the Asian markets, with new pipelines and oil terminals coming on line, may reduce the flow of oil through the Druzhba oil pipeline, the article states.While the analysis on EurActiv concentrates on the impact on Poland and Germany and forcing traders in these countries to buy through Baltic ports, there may be a more severe impact on more landlocked countries of Central Europe that are more highly dependent on Druzhba for oil.
The other oil import options open to Slovakia and Hungary are primarily through the existing pipeline connected to Krk in Croatia. However, a trial of this a few years ago, showed that the oil was more expensive to import than through the Druzhba pipeline which Hungary is (basically) totally dependent on. This make sense even when you consider the lower cost involved in pipelines.
But then we have the obligatory quote concerning the death of Druzhba.
“With the Chinese pipeline due to start any day and the launch of Ust Luga, I’m wondering if we will witness the death of Druzhba. Merkel should call her ‘friend’ Putin to figure out what’s going on,” one trader with a Russian major said.
The slow decline, or rather, slow drying up of Druzhba may occur because of a lack of interest of Russia into the region. While it is unfathomable to think that Russia would let the grapes wither on the vine in Central Europe, forcing them to seek energy resources away from Mother Russia; this may happen through unprepared policies or a lack of foresight into the oil sources necessary for the delivery to Central Europe. Overtime a slow shift may occur.
The fact that Russia/Surgutneftegaz is interested in operating through/with MOL by owning 20% of the company may have secured the region against this slow decline. The involvement in the refinery of the oil produced from Russia adds the value-added and profit level that would maintain Russia’s interest in the region. This does not mean that Russia will pull back ‘purposely’ from the region, but rather if the oil does fetch higher prices through other routes, then a reduction of flow to the region cannot be ruled out.
Hungary and MOL have blocked the investment avenue that Moscow and Surgutneftegas were seeking in the region. There is no doubt that the Russians maintain a strong interest in the CEE/SEE region and for operating more in the refinery sector (and gas is of course always an interest). But reduced oil flows to Hungary and Slovakia will not necessarily increase the countries’ security of supply by forcing them to diversify to a more expensive source. The fact that the pipeline already exists to Croatia adds the necessary security of supply element, expensive oil does not have to be shipped through it to actually improve supply diversity. The higher price to be paid for shipments through Croatia, and the fact that in this one area, Russia has been a reliable supplier, may just mean consumers will have to get used to higher oil prices.
In providing analysis on the CEE/SEE region, I usually try to take a conservative approach. One of my underlining understandings of how energy markets work, and even life, is that sustained change, is usually not brought about by one purposeful action, but smaller actions that culminate into something big. In the case of oil shipments from Russia, through Druzhba, we may, have an uncoordinated and gradual decline. While this allows the region time to prepare, (if anyone notices) it also means this will come at a much higher cost. For Hungarians, the price for blocking Surgutneftegaz may be higher than whatever they now find under the carpet to give to the Russians.
About Michael LaBelle
Michael LaBelle provides a critical but light hearted analysis of the complex field of EU and CEE/SEE energy politics and business. He is based in Budapest, Hungary. He can be reached at michael.labelle(at)energyscee.com